Here presented is a model of many goal-oriented stochastic automata.
The behavior is called optimal or c-optimal according to whether the average penalty is equal or arbitrarily close, respectively, to the minimum value. Krylov and Tsetlin [23 introduced the concept of games between automata and studied in particular Two-Automaton Zero-Sum games.
Stochastic automata with variable structure have been introduced by Varshavskii and Vorntsova [33 to represent learning automata attempt-ting a certain norm of behavior in an unknown random environment. Since the date of that work a respectable number of works has appeared, studying different aspects of learning automata and applying it in simulating very simple norms of behavior (like that introduced by Tsetlin) and also simple automata games (such as Two-Automaton Zero-Sum games).
For a survey on the subject we refer to Narendra and Thathacher [4] .
The contribution of this paper is to direct the attention of using learning automata to simulate an important class of problems of collective behavior whose deterministic version has been the subject of recent investigation mainly by Malishevskii and Tenisberg, see [5] [ 7] .
In that class of problems there exists a type of relation in the collective where the behavior of the participants possesses a definite mutual opposition. Such situation can arise for example in economic systems :
the case of price regulation in a competitive market [8] ; or in management systems : the problems of resource allocation [9] .
In the model introduced in this paper a collectice of interacting stochastic automata is considered. Each automaton has a behavioral tactic directed towards the realization of its own goal, taken to be the extremun of a certain utility function. That function depends explicitly on the automaton strategy and the environment response. The automata interactions arise from the dependence of the environment response on the whole set of strategies used by the collective of automata.
That dependence is generally stochastic and unknown to all the automata.
Furthermore, any automaton does not know neither the utility functions, nor even the number of the other automata. The only available knowledge to each automaton is the realization of its utility function following the use of a certain strategy.
The use of automata game to model the process of market price regulation (or optimization), described in Karlin [8] , from the viewpoint of collective behaviour was demonstrated by Tenisberg [5] . In his work, Tenisberg [5] made two assumptions. The first assumption is connected with the substitution of the probability characteristics of the buyers'
demand by deterministic characteristics (mean value). This is equivalent to the assumption that the transactions are sufficiently numerous.
The second assumption is that already in a time small compared to the characteristic time of the system a fairly large number of interactions between the sellers and the buyers occur. These assumptions permit the model to be described approximately by deterministic differential equations. Later Malishevskii and Tenisberg [6] formulated theorems about the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium situation in the game (in the sense of Nash) and the attainability of this situation in the process of the automata game. ton A i will be assumed to take one of the k I. values fl i,...,fki.i which will be called its strategies° We will say that the automaton A I uses the j-th strategy if fi(t) = f.i. J A play f(t) carried out at time t will be the name given to a set f(t) = (f1(t),...,fN(t)) of the strategies used by the automata A ],..., A N at time t. The outcome s(t) of a play f(t) is a set s(t) = (s I (t)~ N ...,s (t)) of the refree or environment responses at time t. The model is depicted schematically in Fig.1 . The environment is completely characterized by the probability P(f(t),s(t)) of the outcome s(t) for every play f(t). As only stationary environments will be considered, the aforementioned probability can simply be written as P(f,s). The game of N automata A i is considered to be a game with independent outcomes, i.e.
Let us introduce the indicator functions ¢i(f) defined by
S F i where M si denotes the mean value with respect to s i, is an utility function of the incentive (or utility) @i The incentive e i depends explicitely on the automaton strategy fl and the environment response s i.
The objective of each i-th automaton is to choose its strategy fi in order to minimize the absolute value of its own indicator function (2.2), i.e. to minimize
In classical N-person games, each player possesses an adequate a priori knowledge of the game, i.e. the criteria and the sets of pure strategies for all the players. It is defined that the i-th player uses the mixed strategy pi = (Pl i'''''pkii) ~f the. uses his pure strategy fj~i with probability pj1(j=],...,ki), j=IZ I pit=l).. Nash's basic theorem states that any finite N-person game has at least one equilibrium situation in mixed strategies (pl,...,pN), that is
-i also denoted by Q (p), is the mathematical expectation of the gain of the i-th player when the set of mixed strategies p=(pl,..,pN) is used.
Unlike N-person~ players automata in automata games do not possess any a priori information about the game° They know neither about the criteria (2.3) nor even the number of game partners. They must choose their strategies (or which is the same their probability vectors pl) in the course of the game by using the only available information : the realizations of their incentive functions @i(fi,si). In studying automata games we thus come to know the behavior of the players in the game process.
The indicator functions ~i(f),i=1,...,N given by (2.2) are assumed to satisfy the conditions of individual and group contramonotonicity E6], i.e. for any subset I of the set of indexes {i}={1,..,N} the function.
~I = Z @i(f)
i~I decreases in the set of own variables fl, i~I and does not decrease in the set of foreign variables fJ,jsI(7 is the complement of I).
If each automaton A i knows its own indicator function }i and its i i strategy fi can take any value in the continuous interval [fl 'fki ] then the optimal tactic can be given by the simple differential relation [5] - [7] o -fz(t) = ~i(f(t)) (2.6)
This means that the trajectories of the system (2.6) converge to the Nash point f* if exists.
Let us emphasize that in the present model of collective behavior the goal of each automaton is not fully determinate, i.e. known only up to certain parameters for which there is no a priori information. provided that an automaton is not at either of the absorbing states and the automaton action has elicited an environment response for which the incentive function @i is greater than zero than at the next time step the probability of the next supremal action is increased; on the other hand if the incentive function is less than zero then the probability of the next infimal action is increased. Otherwise, that is if the automaton is at either of the absorbing states or the incentive function is zero, the automaton remains in the status quo. That idea can be analytically represented by the following updating scheme for the automata strategis. Provided that fi(t) = f.i then 
ENVIRONMENT MODEL
As said before the environment is completely characterized by the probability P(f,s) of the outcome s(t) for every play f(t). That probability also fully specifies the interaction between the automata.
In the following we present two different models of the environment, named the "pairwise comparison" and the "proportional utility". The total probability of a response from the j-th element of the environment to the i-th automaton can be written thus
The response of the j-th element of the environment to the i-th automaton is considered to be in the form In this model each element of the environment responds to the automata with probabilities proportionable to the utilities of their strategies. The probability of a response from an element increases as the utility of an automaton strategy increases and becomes maximum for maximum utility. Hence the probability that the j-th element responds to the i-th automaton can be expressed thus, The utility of that incentive may be interpreted differently by the sel- The nonlinearity of the utility function F i for a cautious or hazardous seller indicates the lack of objectivity of such psychological types.
Thus a hazardous type overestimates the importance of a good deal (~J > O)
and underestimates the importance of the deal in the opposite situation This means that the purshasing transaction between the j-th buyer and the i-th seller will be completed only when the buyer's available amount of money B j equals or exceeds the price fi of a unit of the commodity.
In the case of reference prices tactic of the buyers [5] the environment is simulated as in section 3.2. In this case the utility of the j-th buyer making his purchase from the i-th seller is given by
where h j is the reference price of the j-th buyer. The function 4(.) is taken to be the same as ~(.) defined by (4.11).
SIMULATION RESULTS.
In all the simulation experiments the following market parameters are considered, The sellers sets of prices are first taken as : Taking ~O = O.1, a satisfactory convergence has been attained at n = 1OO. At that time step, the average of price probabilities <corres-ponding to 10 trials) are which, presumably, is close to the equilibrium point.
The influence of the width A of the active zone was also tested with objective types of sellers and ¥O = O.!. With A = 2 (which means that ~ was equal to O or I when the prices were different) we obtained the following mean probability matrix (the mean of 10 trials) : As A ÷ O, the competition by the prices tends to be uneffective; as the demand will be basically determined by the money flux into the market, and the commodity supply available to each seller. In such condition, it seems natural that each seller attempts to specify the highest possible price for his commodity. If the commodity supplies to the different sellers vary only slightly, the limit prices tend to be almost the same. This is verified by the simulation results.
Also, as in the deterministic case (cf. Tenisberg [5] ), the effect of a small A, is more or less an equalization of prices in the market. We put ~0 = 0.1 and a = 200. The mean probability matrix at n = 100 became : Compared to the objective case, the last two tables demonstrate that the hazardous sellers tend to increase the probability of higher prices, while the cautious sellers tempt to increase the probability of lower prices. This result has no analog in deterministic modelling; where the sellers psychology does not affect the equilibrium prices, cf. Krylatykh
[103. In stochastic modelling, however, the expectation of the utility being zero does not imply that the expectation of the utility is zero due to the nonlinear from of the utility function in the case of hazardous or cautious types. In any case; the previous result agrees more with intuition and favors stochastic modelling for more realistic simulation.
Let us now reduce the number of buyers. Take u = 7. This means less money flow into the market. All the other market parameters remain the same as before.
Considering objective sellers, the following mean price probabilities have been reached at n = 100, for different widths of the active zone : Changing the reference prices h j did not bring significant changes to the equilibrium probabilities.
CONCLUSIONS.
A model of many goal-oriented stochastic automata is introduced for the study of a certain class of problems of operations research. 
